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Summary
Legislation to establish a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) includes
provisions for an information analysis element within the new department (see H.R.
5710).  It does not transfer to DHS existing government intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, but envisions an analytical office utilizing the products of other
agencies–both unevaluated information and finished reports–to provide warning of
terrorist attacks, assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for remedial actions
at the federal, state, and local levels and by the private sector.  This report examines the
information analysis function and the sharing information among federal agencies but
does not address provisions in the proposed legislation governing the sharing of
intelligence with state and local officials; it will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Introduction
Better intelligence is held by many observers to be a crucial factor in preventing
future terrorist attacks.  Concerns have been expressed that no single agency or office in
the federal government prior to September 11, 2001 was in a position to “connect the
dots” between diffuse pieces of information that might have provided clues to the planned
attacks.  Testimony before the two intelligence committees’ Joint Inquiry on the
September 11 attacks indicated that significant information in the possession of
intelligence and law enforcement agencies was not fully shared with other agencies and
that intelligence on potential terrorist threats against the United States was not fully
exploited.
For many years, the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information was
effected by administrative policies and statutory prohibitions.  Beginning in the early
1990s, however, much effort has gone into improving interagency coordination.1   In
addition, a number of statutory obstacles have been removed by the USA-Patriot Act of
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2001 and other legislation.2  Nevertheless, there has been no one place where the
analytical effort is centered; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is designed to
remedy that perceived deficiency.
Background
The Bush Administration’s legislative proposal for a Department of Homeland
Security,  released July 16, 2002, was incorporated in H.R. 5005, introduced on June 24,
2002 by Representative Armey.  Title II of the bill, Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, as subsequently amended and passed by the House on July 26,
included provisions to establish an Intelligence Analysis Center to give intelligence
support to the homeland security effort and to identify priorities for measures to protect
key sources and critical infrastructures.  In the Senate, Senator Lieberman had introduced
legislation (S. 2452) to establish a Department of National Homeland Security on May
2, 2002.  The original version of S.2452 did not address the intelligence function, but
subsequent amendments in the nature of a substitute included provisions establishing a
Directorate of Intelligence as an integral part of the new department. After the November
2002 elections a modified version of homeland security legislation was introduced by
Representative Armey as H.R. 5710 and passed by the House on November 13, 2002.
The final version would establish a Directorate for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection headed by an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate) with an Assistant Secretary of Information Analysis (appointed by the
President).   The legislation, especially the Information Analysis section, seeks to promote
close ties between intelligence analysts and those responsible for assessing vulnerabilities
of key U.S. infrastructure. The bill envisions an intelligence entity focused on receiving
and analyzing information3 from other government agencies and using it to provide
warning of terrorist attacks and for addressing vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit.
DHS is not intended to duplicate the collection effort of intelligence agencies; it will
not have its own agents, satellites, or signals intercept sites. Major intelligence agencies
are not transferred to the DHS, although some DHS elements, including Customs and the
Coast Guard, will continue to collect information that is crucial to analyzing terrorist
threats. 
The information analysis element within DHS will have the responsibility for
acquiring and reviewing information from the agencies of the Intelligence Community,
from law enforcement agencies, state and local government agencies, and unclassified
publicly available information (known as open source information or “osint”) from books,
periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, media, etc. The legislation is explicit that, “Except
as otherwise directed by the President,  the Secretary [of DHS] shall have such access as
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the Secretary considers necessary to all information, including reports, assessments,
analyses, and unevaluated intelligence relating to threats of terrorism against the United
States and to other areas of responsibility assigned by the Secretary, and to all information
concerning infrastructures or other vulnerabilities of the United States to terrorism,
whether or not such information has been analyzed, that may be collected, possessed, or
prepared by any agency of the Federal Government.”4
DHS analysts would be charged with using this information to identify and assess
the nature and scope of terrorist threats; produce comprehensive vulnerability assessments
of key resources and infrastructure, to identify priorities for protective and support
measures by DHS, by other agencies of the federal government, state and local
government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities.  They will
disseminate information to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response
to, terrorist attacks against the U.S.  The intelligence element is also charged with
recommending measures necessary for protecting key resources and critical infrastructure
in coordination with other federal agencies.  
DHS would be responsible for ensuring that any material received is protected from
unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance of official duties.
(This provision addresses a concern that sensitive personal information made available
to DHS analysts could be misused.)  Intelligence information would be transmitted,
retained, and disseminated consistent with policies established under the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sources and methods and
similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement
information.5   
Issues Under Discussion
DHS Role in the Intelligence Community.  The U.S. Intelligence Community,
consists of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some 14 other agencies;6 it provides
information in various forms to the White House and other federal agencies (as well as
to Congress).  In addition, law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), also collect information for use in the federal government7. 
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Within the Intelligence Community, priorities for collection (and to some extent for
analysis) are established by the DCI,8 based in practice on inter-agency discussions.
Being “at the table” when priorities are discussed, it is widely believed, helps ensure
equitable allocations of limited collection resources.  The legislation would make the
DHS element concerned with analyses of foreign intelligence information a member of
the Intelligence Community, thus giving DHS a formal role when intelligence collection
and analysis priorities are being addressed.  It will also facilitate access to intelligence
databases and other analytical resources.  Some observers have expressed concern that
this provision will involve DHS in extensive Intelligence Community staff responsibilities
and would require more personnel resources than currently envisioned for DHS, thereby
detracting from the intended focus on analysis of terrorist threats. 
A similar situation has long existed in the State Department which has a Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) that is also a component of the Intelligence Community.
Charged with providing intelligence input to the policymaking process, INR has had to
strive to avoid letting policy goals of the Department influence its intelligence judgments.
Most observers credit INR with having performed responsibly over the years.  Being a
component of the Intelligence Community has allowed INR to have direct and close
access to intelligence data and analysis as well as to influence the establishment of
collection and analysis priorities.  
The Question of “Raw” Intelligence.  There has been some discussion in the
media whether DHS will have access to “raw” intelligence or only to finished analytical
products, but these reports may reflect uncertainty regarding the definition of “raw”
intelligence.  A satellite photograph standing by itself might be considered “raw” data, but
it would be useless unless something were known about where and when it was taken.
Thus, satellite imagery supplied to DHS would under almost any circumstances have to
have some analysis included.  The same would apply to any signals intercepts.  Reports
from human agents present special challenges.  Some assessment of the reliability of the
source would have to be provided to DHS, but information that would identify a specific
individual would normally be retained within a very small number of intelligence
officials; the further such sensitive information is spread, the greater the danger of
unauthorized disclosure and harm to the source. Observers believe that in almost all cases
analysts can work without knowing the name of a specific source.
Open Source Information (Osint).  Information from unclassified
sources–books, pamphlets, periodicals, Internet sources, television and radio programs–is
arguably an important resource for gaining information about terrorist groups and the
larger political movements with which they are associated.  There are different views
regarding the emphasis to which intelligence agencies should give to open source
information.  DCI George Tenet in prepared testimony for the Senate Government Affairs
Committee on June 27, 2002, stated that “In every possible case, we will provide
intelligence at the lowest permissible level of classification, including sensitive, but
unclassified.”9 Pointedly, he did not include open source information.  DHS may have to
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undertake procedures to collect and analyze osint without support from intelligence
agencies.
Analytical Quality.  The key test for the DHS will be the quality of the analytical
product–whether terrorist groups can be identified and warning given of plans for attacks
on the U.S.  While most observers acknowledge that focusing in one office the
responsibility for identifying terrorist threats will remedy a fundamental limitation of
existing arrangements, it is also understood that creating such an office will be difficult.
The types of information that have to be analyzed come from disparate sources and
require a variety of analytical skills that are not in plentiful supply.  Academic institutions
prepare significant numbers of linguists and areas specialists, but training in the inner
workings of clandestine terrorist entities is less often undertaken.  Analysts with law
enforcement backgrounds may not be attuned to the foreign environments from which
terrorist groups emerge.  DHS will begin with analysts detailed from existing intelligence
and law enforcement agencies along with, presumably, some newly hired personnel. It
will be necessary that previous bureaucratic competitors merge into an effective office and
that a culture of objectivity and adherence to high standards be established from the
outset.
Conclusion
Legislation creating a homeland security department recognizes the crucial
importance of intelligence to the counterterrorist effort.  It proposes an analytical office
within DHS that will be able to draw upon all the information gathering resources of other
government agencies and of the private sector.  It envisions the DHS information analysis
entity working closely with other DHS offices, other federal agencies, state and local
officials, and the private sector to devise strategies and programs to protect U.S.
vulnerabilities and to provide warning of specific attacks.  It provides for maintaining the
security of classified and sensitive information and require its use only for official
purposes.  The success of a DHS intelligence entity will, however, be largely dependent
upon the quality of leadership, the skills of analysts, and the cooperation provided by
federal, state, local, and private agencies.
